s the recent economic crisis has demonstrated, inequality often spans credit and labor markets, supporting a system of cumulative disadvantage. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, this research draws on stigma, cumulative disadvantage and status characteristics theories to examine whether credit and labor markets intersect through the event of bankruptcy to disadvantage certain individuals over time. The transmission of bankruptcy's stigma across markets occurs in a specific legal setting where, even though the current U.S. Bankruptcy Code grants bankrupters a fresh start through debt forgiveness, the Fair Credit Reporting Act limits bankrupters' ability to begin anew because it permits employers to access credit reports. My findings highlight these ambiguities and show that, net of their previous labor market statuses, bankrupters spend less time working and have lower earnings than nonbankrupters. Thus, having become bankrupt exposes people to subsequent disadvantage in the labor market.
Although the labor market functions as the primary mechanism for the distribution of income in the United States, credit markets can also enhance, maintain or reduce inequality. In his identification of multiple bases of stratification, Weber ([1922]1946; 1978:927-28) included property ownership as a basic category of class situations that influences a person's labor market situation. Credit markets continue to preserve advantage for the wealthy and disadvantage the poor, but, as the recent foreclosure crisis has demonstrated, members of all classes are vulnerable to shifts in the market. Thus, while labor and debtor struggles have historically been segmented, the creditor-debtor relationship can become the basis of multiple class struggles (Wiley 1967) . In this paper I use the event of bankruptcy to investigate how credit and labor markets jointly exacerbate inequality within a specific legal context.
Credit and labor markets jointly shape inequality when resources gained in one market are required to obtain resources in the other, such as when mortgage lenders require proof of income. This relationship can also occur when a status attained in one sphere limits or expands opportunities in the other. For example, a college degree opens up many opportunities in the labor market, but motherhood can restrict access to jobs (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007) . The second situation reflects a process of ascription in which resources are allocated based upon categorical group membership. Although it is not a typical ascriptive status, because bankruptcy serves as a key indicator of people's credit market standing, it has the potential to limit the accumulation of resources in multiple areas.
Bankruptcy is governed by a specific federal policy that can punish debtors or provide them with the opportunity to start over by purging previous debt. The offer of debt forgiveness under U.S. bankruptcy law should attenuate the link between people's credit and labor market statuses, but stipulations within the Fair Credit Reporting Act do not always permit a fresh start for bankrupters. In many cases, bankruptcy positively affects a person's position in the credit market by relieving debt. However, bankruptcy also acts a stigmatized, but formalized, status distinction that is imprinted on a person's credit history. When lenders, landlords and employers access this information through credit reports, it contributes to a system that can exacerbate disadvantage for delinquent debtors, leading to further hardships instead of a new beginning.
Researchers in the Consumer Bankruptcy Project have shown that debtors turn to bankruptcy when faced with certain adverse events, but the data permit only speculation about the consequences of bankruptcy (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1989, 2000; Porter and Thorne 2006; Thorne 2007) . This article addresses its consequences by investigating the labor market outcomes for bankrupters. I build on theories of cumulative disadvantage by examining whether, how and for whom credit markets transmit disadvantage to labor markets. I combine cumulative disadvantage with the concept of stigma to explain why certain stigmatized statuses, such as bankruptcy, can lead to growing inequality. I then use status characteristics theory to demonstrate how the assignment of worth to a particular characteristic -bankruptcy -leads to the unequal distribution of resources within the labor market (Ridgeway 1991; DiPrete and Eirich 2006) . Because these theories address inequality over time, I use National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY; 1979 Cohort) data to investigate how the stigmatized status of "bankrupter" affects an individual's later labor market outcomes.
I begin this article by discussing stigma, status characteristics theory and cumulative disadvantage. Although sociologists typically use the term "cumulative advantage" for processes of increasing inequality, I apply the term "cumulative disadvantage" to signify a relative loss of assets, resources and opportunities for bankrupters. I then describe the ambiguities in bankruptcy policy in the United States. After discussing my data and methods, I show that bankrupters subsequently experience disadvantage in the labor market. They spend fewer weeks working and have lower earnings than nonbankrupters, net of their previous labor market situations and unobserved individual characteristics. These negative effects contradict the aims of debt forgiveness and highlight the potential problems associated with employers' use of credit reports.
Theoretical Framework

The Stigma of Bankruptcy
The stigma of bankruptcy has been evident in America since the 18 th century when insolvency was associated with moral failure and debtors were often imprisoned (Mann 2002) . Although some researchers have argued that this stigma has declined over time (Fay, Hurst, and White 1998, 2002; Gross and Souleles 2002) , others describe a constant, but changing, stigma (White 1998; Mann 2002; Athreya 2004; Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 2006) . For example, in a review of newspaper articles from 1864 through 2002, Efrat (2006) showed that prior to the 1960s the public viewed bankrupters as deceitful and immoral. During the 1960s, however, newspapers described bankrupters as unethical and irresponsible, but no longer as immoral. Most recently they have depicted bankrupters as struggling individuals who declared bankruptcy due to circumstances beyond their control. Bankrupters are now stigmatized for their financial, but not always their moral, failures (Efrat 2006) .
As a stigma, or in Goffman's (1963:3) terminology, "an attribute that is deeply discrediting," bankruptcy holds a particular negative status value, which is reflected in general perceptions of bankrupters and in their financial troubles. To examine the postbankruptcy situations of bankrupters researchers have primarily relied on data from Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's (1989, 2000) Consumer Bankruptcy Project. These data consist of three waves of bankrupter petitions and questionnaires collected in eight federal judicial districts in 1981, 1991, and 2001 , along with a fourth wave that was collected in 2007 and based on a national random sample of bankrupters (Lawless et al. 2008; Porter 2012) . While bankruptcy improved the financial situations for most bankrupters, approximately one-third of the 2001 sample reported that their financial situations had stayed the same (27 percent) or worsened (8 percent) within a year of declaring bankruptcy (Porter and Thorne 2006:87) . One-quarter of respondents reported postbankruptcy financial distress, especially in relation to new bills and income instability (Porter and Thorne 2006:84) . These continuing financial problems indicate that declaring bankruptcy does not always allow individuals to purge debt without being stigmatized.
In addition to continuing financial stress, bankruptcy's stigma can impede an individual's ability to start over in credit and labor markets (Porter and Thorne 2006) . As Thorne (2007) noted, bankruptcy acted as a "red flag" for denials and inflated fees in the credit market. Bankrupters reported being denied credit cards and checking accounts, along with mortgage, auto and personal loans (Thorne 2007:30-31) . Those bankrupters who were granted loans faced more paperwork and fees because of their credit history (Thorne 2007:33-34) . A small fraction of Thorne's sample (6 percent) also reported that they were fired from or had trouble finding a job because of the bankruptcy on their credit reports. Denial of employment was highest in "high-trust" lines of work, particularly those related to banking and accounting (Thorne 2007:36) .
Status characteristics theory links bankruptcy's stigma, or negative status value, with the unequal distribution of resources seen in these continuing financial problems (Ridgeway 1991; Webster and Hysom 1998) . According to Ridgeway (1991:368) , status value or worth is conferred when "consensual cultural beliefs indicate that persons who have one state of the characteristics (e.g., whites or males) are more worthy in society than those with another state of the characteristics (blacks or females)." Bankruptcy's stigma stems from broader perceptions of debt delinquency and financial irresponsibility, and it affects the distribution of resources in relation to that status.
Bankruptcy is more than just a stigmatized status, though. Bankruptcy acts as a formal status or credential that is imprinted on a person's credit and legal history. In her work on incarceration and employment, Pager (2007:32-37) conceptualized the status of a former prisoner as a "negative criminal credential" that limits access to opportunity. According to Pager (2007:36) , unlike typical ascriptive markers, credentials represent formalized status distinctions that can be used to define legal rights or barriers, which legitimizes their use for the distribution of resources. Like a previous incarceration, bankruptcy can also act as a negative credential, which legitimizes the distribution of resources associated with this status, affects the accumulation of additional resources and can spark a pattern of cumulative disadvantage.
Cumulative Advantage and Disadvantage Across Markets
According to cumulative advantage/disadvantage theory, achieved and ascribed statuses can have persisting effects in returns to resources, leading to diverging outcomes in which some persons continually build their resources relative to others (Blau and Duncan 1967; DiPrete and Eirich 2006) . 1 The most common ascriptive statuses of race and gender are assigned at birth, but other statuses can be attained throughout people's lives and have similar lasting effects. Bankruptcy's stigma, legal status and negative effects illustrate its negative status value and potential to further disadvantage bankrupters in multiple markets.
Disadvantage accumulates across markets when a person's situation in one market influences outcomes in the other and stigma travels between markets. For example, Pager (2007) has shown how criminal records lead to disadvantage in the labor market and continued unemployment for felons. Other research demonstrates how historical labor market discrimination contributed to wealth accumulation in the black community, and how the current racial wealth gap exacerbates employment and education inequality (Oliver and Shapiro 1997; Conley 1999; National Research Council 2004) . In the case of race and gender, federal laws banning certain forms of discrimination impede, but have not eliminated, the transmission of disadvantage across markets. As I discuss in the next section, federal bankruptcy law has the potential to do the same, but its effectiveness is limited by employers' use of credit scores in hiring.
Bankruptcy as a Fresh Start
Since the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, federal bankruptcy laws have permitted debtors to file for bankruptcy, and the current U.S. Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978, continues to promote debtor forgiveness after assets are used to repay creditors (Tabb 1995; Skeel 2001; Warren and Westbrook 2009 (White 2007a (White , 2007b , Congress has retained a policy that provides the opportunity for a fresh start for debtors, which includes exemptions and protections against discriminatory treatment (11 U.S.C. § § 522, 523, 525).
The current Bankruptcy Code prohibits government and private employers from discriminating against bankrupters "with respect to employment" (11 U.S.C. § 525), but the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA; 1996) allows employers to access an applicant's credit report, which bankruptcy remains on for approximately 10 years (Musto 1999) . 3 The FCRA lists employment as a "permissible purpose" for the use of credit reports, but requires employers to notify an applicant if a report is obtained and if it is used in an adverse decision (15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681t ; Furletti 2002; Hunt 2005; Sprague 2007 ). Because lenders, insurers, and employers currently use credit reports to evaluate "trustworthiness" and "credit worthiness" in their decisions, reports contribute to disparities in wealth accumulation between persons with better and worse credit scores (Marron 2007; Moulton 2007) .
Although data on employers' requests of credit scores are rarely available to the public, a few surveys have documented the use of credit scores in employment decisions (Furletti 2002; Hunt 2005; Sprague 2007) . A 2006 survey indicated that 11 percent of Fortune 1000 firms used background checks, and a 2010 survey by the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) noted that 60 percent of its 343 employer members used credit checks as a hiring tool for some positions (Piotrowski and Armstrong 2006; SHRM 2010) . Recent newspaper articles document the rise in the employers' use of credit scores and the continuing controversy surrounding them (Bushnell 2004; Glater 2009; Martin 2010) . Legislators and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have also begun to express interest about the potential discriminatory outcomes of this practice, which could lead to the accumulation of disadvantage across markets (EEOC 2010) .
Research Questions
Although the Consumer Bankruptcy Project indicates that bankrupters may be stigmatized in the labor market, research from the Project primarily describes the situations of bankrupters. It does not systematically compare bankrupters' situations with those of people who never declared bankruptcy. For example, most of Thorne's (2007) findings are based on the respondents' perceptions of the effects of bankruptcy on their later labor market statuses. I build on these descriptive findings with statistical analyses based on respondents' postbankruptcy actual situations. In addition, my sample includes nonbankrupters and data on bankrupters before they declared bankruptcy.
I use longitudinal data to determine if and how bankruptcy affects labor market situations for a cohort of individuals. I analyze both postbankruptcy employment and earnings, addressing the following research questions: Does bankruptcy negatively affect people's labor market outcomes, as measured by earnings and hours of work? Do these outcomes vary by the person's education, employment situation, previous earnings and occupation? Are these outcomes affected by a bankrupter's previous experience of adverse events, such as job loss, divorce or illness? Finally, do these effects diminish over time as federal bankruptcy policy implies?
With the first research question I investigate whether the stigmatized status of bankruptcy affects a person's subsequent labor market situation. Due to bankruptcy's stigmatized and often discouraging status, combined with the ambiguities within U.S. bankruptcy and credit law, I expect that bankrupters will earn less and work less after bankruptcy. The second and third research questions focus on potential explanations and mechanisms behind bankruptcy's labor market effects. I anticipate that bankruptcy's effects will vary by respondents' previous employment situations, as Thorne's (2007) findings suggest. The final research question specifically addresses cumulative disadvantage theory by focusing on whether the income and employment situations of bankrupters and nonbankrupters diverge over time. A divergence in labor market outcomes for bankrupters and nonbankrupters supports a model of growing disadvantage and challenges the goals of bankruptcy laws that aim to offer debtors a new beginning.
Although my analysis cannot explicitly observe the mechanisms through which bankruptcy could negatively affect a person's subsequent labor market status, several likely mechanisms exist. First, bankrupters' poor credit and labor market situations could simply stem from a reckless disposition, negligent behavior or other individual characteristics. This mechanism suggests that bankrupters would have lower earnings than nonbankrupters regardless of their bankruptcy status. Second, bankruptcy's apparent labor market effects could reflect the ongoing consequences of adverse events that led people into bankruptcy. Third, the status of bankruptcy could act as a proxy for the status of a delinquent debtor, where it is not bankruptcy, but debt delinquency that is stigmatized and, hence, negatively linked to labor market position. In that situation bankrupters would be only a small proportion of people who face negative labor market outcomes because of their poor credit market statuses. Finally, bankruptcy could affect earnings and employment outcomes because of its stigmatization by employers, who learn of it through interviews, credit reports and background checks. Even though I cannot fully adjudicate among all mechanisms, my analytic strategies, which include fixed effects models, help me to rule out the first two potential mechanisms, lending support for the second two.
Data, Methods and Measures
Few datasets contain detailed information on debt and even fewer contain longitudinal debt data. However, a prominent longitudinal study, the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), added questions on bankruptcy in 2004. The NLSY is a nationally representative sample of 6,111 respondents who were between 14 and 22 years of age when first surveyed in 1979. 4 By 2008 the sample had declined to 4,723 individuals, then between 42 and 50 years of age. For my analyses, I rely on a sample of workers with annual earnings between $1 and $250,000 and weekly working hours between 5 and 100. 5 After also dropping respondents not interviewed in 2004 or 2008, observations with missing data and individuals with fewer than two observations, I obtained a longitudinal sample of 4,291 cases (i.e., individuals) and 55,110 observations (i.e., person years) spanning from 1979-2008. 6 Information on bankruptcy was collected in the 2004 and 2008 surveys, which asked respondents if and when they declared bankruptcy. These retrospective data, which I coded back to 1979, permit an analysis of bankruptcy's effects. 7 From 1979 through 2008, the cumulative number of reported bankruptcy filings was 586; 12.4 percent of respondents filed for bankruptcy at least once. The percentage of respondents declaring bankruptcy each year tended to increase as the cohort aged, ranging from .07 percent in 1979 to 1.15 percent in 2002. The data overestimate the number of bankruptcy filings in the U.S. population because the NLSY focuses on a particular cohort of individuals that was exposed to certain economic trends, including recessions and employment opportunities, and to specific bankruptcy laws.
Methods
I use fixed effects models to investigate the consequences of bankruptcy because they allow me to control for unobserved individual characteristics while studying the effects of time-varying factors over time (Allison 1994 (Allison , 2009 ). When applied to panel data, fixed effects models focus on within-individual differences over time, which means that I am essentially comparing individuals before and after they declare bankruptcy. By focusing on within-individual variation over time, fixed effects models remove bias that can result through selection based on stable, individual characteristics; however, these models cannot estimate coefficients for time-invariant variables, such as race and sex, that have no withinsubject variation.
To ensure that bankruptcy occurs prior to employment outcomes and to control for a person's earlier labor market situation, I estimate models that incorporate a time lag between my predictor and outcome variables. Thus, I use whether the respondent declared bankruptcy any time within the past 10 years at time t-1 to predict earnings and employment outcomes at time t. All predictor variables are separated from the outcome variables by 1 to 2 years. The time lag changes from one to two years because NLSY data were collected biennially after 1994. 8 Equation 1 represents the general fixed effects model for continuous data, which I use to estimate an individual's logged earnings and yearly hours worked at time t,
( 1) where i indexes the individual respondent and t indexes yearly observations per individual, µ t is an intercept that varies with time, α i controls for the average differences across individuals in unobservable predictors, βx i t ( ) −1 represents the time-varying coefficients and predictor variables, and ε it is the error term, which has a mean of 0 and constant variance. The model assumes that, α i and, ε it are independent, but, βx i t ( ) −1 and α i are correlated. In all analyses, I also apply robust standard errors to account for clustering around the individual in the data. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for a single year -2008 for outcome variables and 2006 for predictor variables -by the respondent's bankruptcy status.
Outcome Variables
I examine the effect of bankruptcy on the individual's logged total earnings from wages and salary and total hours worked per year at the current time period, which I refer to as time t. All earnings variables are in 2008 dollars. I Note: All values are given as percentages unless otherwise specified. Source: NLSY 1979 Cohort, 1979 -2008 logged the earnings variable to better fit the assumptions underlying regression. I did not use a log transformation of hours worked because it is generally normally distributed with a mean of 2,143 hours per year, or slightly more than 40 hours per week.
Predictor Variables
All of my predictor and control variables are measured at the previous time period (t-1). My first predictor variable measures whether the respondent or the respondent's spouse declared bankruptcy within the previous 10 years. 9 I use this time span because any labor market effects may extend beyond the period immediately after bankruptcy and because bankruptcy specifically appears on a person's credit report for 10 years, although it may continue to affect a person's score later on (Musto 1999) . By 2006, 13.7 percent of respondents had ever declared bankruptcy and 9.7 percent declared bankruptcy within the past 10 years ( Table 1 ). The employment ratios of bankrupters resembled those of nonbankrupters, but nonbankrupters out-earned respondents who declared bankruptcy by almost $10,000 in 2008.
To estimate the effects of bankruptcy over time, I created a second variable that measures a respondent's time since bankruptcy. This variable has six categories indicating whether the respondent never declared bankruptcy, declared bankruptcy in the past year, 1 to 3 years ago, 4 to 6 years ago, 7 to 10 years ago or more than 10 years ago. Within this categorical variable I separated out very recent bankruptcy filings (within the last year) and created 3-year categories up to 10 years after bankruptcy. If the effects of bankruptcy on labor market outcomes are greater for respondents who declared bankruptcy longer ago, this relationship would support a model of cumulative disadvantage where the situations of bankrupters and nonbankrupters diverge over time.
Time-Varying Control Variables
The control variables for this analysis incorporate demographic, employment, health and family differences, variables researchers commonly control for in studies of employment and earnings inequality (see, e.g., Kenworthy 2007; Leicht 2008) . I control for the respondent's age, marital status and presence of children at time t-1. I include age squared to account for any nonlinear relationship between age and my outcome variables. 10 Marital status indicates whether the respondent was married, formerly married (separated, divorced, or widowed), or never married. I treat the presence of any children as a binary variable.
To take into account measures of the respondent's human capital and previous employment situation, I also control for education, cumulative number of jobs, hours worked, logged earnings, any number of weeks looking for work, self-employment and employment in finance or accounting occupations at time t-1. I measure education as the number of completed years of schooling because this is how the NLSY measures education level. Because including a lagged d ependent variable in a fixed effects analysis can bias results, I do not include lagged measures of logged earnings and hours worked in models where these variables are the outcomes (Allison 1990 (Allison , 2009 Angrist and Pischke 2009 ). However, I control for hours worked at time t-1 in models predicting logged earnings, and I control for logged earnings at time t-1 in models predicting hours worked.
Across all models I control for whether the respondent spent any time looking for work and for whether the respondent was self-employed to address respondents who might be subjected to stigmatization within the labor market. I also include dummy variables indicating whether the person worked in finance or accounting occupations during the previous year because they are high-trust occupations in which bankrupters could face harsher penalties.
I account for whether the respondent experienced an adverse event of job loss, illness or divorce in the past 10 years, the same time frame that I use for bankruptcy, as a control for some of the events that lead people to declare bankruptcy and could continue to affect their earnings and employment (Sullivan et al. 1989 (Sullivan et al. , 2000 . As Table 1 shows, a higher proportion of bankrupters experienced all of these adverse events within the past 10 years compared with nonbankrupters.
Contextual Variables
To allow for the possibility that states differ in ways that might influence the effects of bankruptcy on labor market outcomes, I control for time period and regional labor market situations. I include variables for the county-level unemployment rate and the state-level bankruptcy-filing rate per 1,000 adults in the population for each respondent and each year. I constructed these variables using location indicators from the NLSY county-level data with historical unemployment and bankruptcy filing information. The county-level unemployment rate, which was calculated by the NLSY, controls for local labor market conditions that might affect the ability of respondents to find work. The state-level bankruptcy-filing rate describes the local environment for bankrupters. Using data from the National Bankruptcy Research Center, the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) calculated the number of bankruptcy filings per state. I then calculated a rate for the adult population by dividing these numbers by the state's population aged 18 years and older, which I obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.
I also control for two state-level legal framework measures that relate to creditors and debtors: the legal interest rate and homestead and property exemptions, which permit debtors to protect certain assets from creditors (National Association of Credit Management 2007). State-level interest rates refer to the maximum rate permitted by state law absent any outside contract (National Association of Credit Management 2007). I coded yearly state homestead and property levels into dollar amounts from 1979 through 2008 using state statutes and historical compilations of bankruptcy laws. 11 Because homestead and property exemption levels vary greatly across states and many state statutes do not list specific monetary amounts for exemptions, I classified state exemption levels in relation to the federal exemption level given for each year. My final classifica-tion scheme comprised five categories: minimal, which included states, such as Pennsylvania and Maryland, with levels less than 50 percent of the federal level; below average, which included states with levels 50 to 99 percent of the federal level; average, which included states with levels 100 to 199 percent of the federal level; above average, which includes states with levels 200 percent of the federal level or higher; and unlimited, which included states, such as Iowa and Texas, with unlimited exemption levels. For this project, I collapsed average and above average into a single category.
Results
As expected, bankruptcy negatively affected respondents' later labor market statuses, net of their previous earnings and employment situations. On average, individuals who declared bankruptcy faced earnings penalties and spent less time working than persons who had never declared bankruptcy in that time period. Importantly, these effects were not consistent across all bankrupters. Generally, bankrupters with more education and earnings faced harsher labor market penalties, a finding that supports mechanisms related to employers' use of bankruptcy in hiring decisions.
Bankruptcy's Labor Market Effects
Across models, bankrupters incurred earnings penalties, net of their previous labor market situations, other controls and unobserved time-invariant characteristics. Table 2 displays the regression results from estimating logged earnings. Model 1 depicts bankruptcy's effects on logged earnings at time t conditioning only on age, while Models 2 and 3 include additional covariates.
Bankrupters' earnings were approximately 11 percent lower than nonbankrupters' earnings in Model 1. Including additional control variables in Model 2 slightly weakened the relationship between bankruptcy and earnings such that declaring bankruptcy within the last 10 years decreased earnings by 7 percent. The added human capital and employment variables were significantly associated with the respondent's current earnings. The county-level unemployment rate and state-level bankruptcy-filing rates were negatively associated with earnings, as was residence in states with unlimited exemption levels when compared with states at the federal level.
When I controlled for the respondent's experience of an adverse event of job loss, divorce or illness within the last 10 years in Model 3, the relationship between bankruptcy and earnings weakened to a 6.7-percent loss for bankrupters. Job loss within the past 10 years was associated with a 4.7-percent decrease in earnings and a health limitation was associated with a 10.6-percent decrease. Net of control variables, however, divorce within the past decade was not significantly associated with earnings. Because controlling for these adverse events did not explain away bankruptcy's effect on later earnings, we can conclude that bankruptcy affected earnings regardless of the adverse events that led up to the respondent's bankruptcy filing. As a second measure of labor market outcomes that could also affect earnings, I estimated bankruptcy's effects on hours worked per year. Table 3 reports the results from fixed effects regressions predicting an individual's hours worked at time t. Repeating the analyses for earnings, Model 1 controls only for age, and Models 2 and 3 include additional control variables.
These regression analyses showed consistent negative effects of bankruptcy on working hours: a decrease of 75 to 93 hours of work in a year, or two to three 40-hour work weeks. In Model 1, which included few controls, bankrupters worked 93 hours less than nonbankrupters, but in Model 2 with more controls, they worked 77 hours less, and in Model 3, which also controlled for the experience of adverse events, they worked 73 hours less. Thus, net of prior adverse events, bankrupters worked less than nonbankrupters.
Some bankrupters surveyed in the Consumer Bankruptcy Project said that filing for bankruptcy hurt their labor market outcomes (Thorne 2007) . This analysis, which uses fixed effects models to control for unobserved individual characteristics that could affect an individual's likelihood of declaring bankruptcy and later labor market situation, shows that such perceptions are founded. In addition, bankruptcy's negative labor market effects provide evidence for its continuing stigma and negative status value, as implied by status characteristics theory.
Variation in Bankruptcy's Labor Market Effects
Although these models show a negative relationship between declaring bankruptcy and later earnings and working hours, they do not fully establish the potential mechanisms behind this relationship. To address these mechanisms I estimated models that included interactions terms related to the respondent's human capital and prior labor market situation. Table 4 depicts the variation in bankruptcy's effects on logged earnings with the addition of interaction terms to Model 3 in Table 2. Table 5 depicts bankruptcy's effects on hours worked with the addition of interaction terms to Model 3 in Table 3 .
In terms of earnings, the negative and significant interaction term for bankruptcy and education in Model 1 in Table 4 indicates that bankruptcy's costs depended on the respondent's years of education. However, the results from Models 1 and 2 in Table 5 , which include additional interaction terms predicting hours worked, show that the effects of bankruptcy on hours of work varied by the respondents' previous earnings, as well as education.
As a better illustration of the earnings and employment differences for bankrupters and nonbankrupters, Figure 1 displays the average predicted change in earnings and yearly hours worked for bankrupters by their education based on the findings in Model 1 in Tables 4 and 5 . I calculated the trend lines in this figure using the coefficients and their covariance matrix with a multivariate normal distribution. In this figure, the respondents' earnings, working hours, bankruptcy status, age and education levels were allowed to vary, but all other variables were held at their means. Because the effect of bankruptcy on future earnings depended on education, the relative difference in earnings was greater between bankrupters and nonbankrupters with more years of completed schooling, as a comparison of Panels A and C in Figure 1 shows. For individuals at the mean level of education in Panel C, declaring bankruptcy within the past 10 years decreased current earnings by approximately $1,900 on average. At higher levels of education (two standard deviations above the mean) in Panel A, bankrupters earned $14,000 less than similar nonbankrupters. The earnings gaps in this model, however, decrease with the respondent's age because of the quadratic age term and the logged outcome variable.
In Panels B and D, hours of work followed a similar pattern in relation to earnings. For individuals at the mean level of education in Panel D, declaring bankruptcy within the past 10 years decreased their time working by 84 hours, or 2 weeks. At two standard deviations above the mean for education in Panel B, bankrupters worked 182 fewer hours, or 4.5 weeks, than their counterparts. Thus, this first set of interactions shows that bankrupters with higher levels of education and previous earnings faced larger labor market penalties.
Some respondents who were denied employment postbankruptcy in Thorne's (2007) sample worked in high-trust occupations, such as accounting and banking. To see if my larger sample replicated this result, I estimated models with interaction terms for persons employed in finance and accounting occupations, which are white-collar jobs that involve working with money. As shown by Model 2 in Table 4 , employment in finance and accounting occupations increased earnings for respondents, but there were no significant monetary differences for bankrupters and nonbankrupters within these occupations. Thus, among this sample, bankrupters in high-trust occupations did not face earnings penalties. For hours worked, however, the interaction term between bankruptcy and employment in finance was significant and negative, indicating a larger hours penalty for bankrupters in this occupation (Model 3 in Table 5 ). In particular, bankrupters in finance worked almost 12 fewer weeks per year than nonbankrupters in that occupation, which lends support to Thorne's (2007) findings and indicates that the stigma of bankruptcy might be affecting bankrupters' ability to find work, perhaps because employers use credit scores within this occupation. Although experiencing adverse events decreased a person's earnings and hours worked, they did not affect bankruptcy's relationship with the outcome variables, as shown by Model 3 in Table 4 and by Model 4 in Table 5 . Bankruptcy had consistent negative effects on earnings and employment regardless of whether a bankrupter experienced an adverse event, which indicates that other mechanisms may be behind this relationship.
Bankruptcy's Labor Market Effects Over Time
The previous sets of models showed a negative relationship between bankruptcy and labor market outcomes that varied by the respondent's education and previous earnings, but they did not indicate whether bankruptcy's effects changed over time. Therefore, I also estimated models that included time since the respondent filed for bankruptcy. Tables 6 and 7 summarize the results from fixed effects regressions where I included a categorical bankruptcy variable based on the respondents' time since bankruptcy. Table 6 shows that, when compared with the referent category of no bankruptcy, bankrupters' earnings gaps varied over time. There were no significant differences in earnings between nonbankrupters and people who declared bankruptcy within the past year. However, bankrupters who declared 1 to 3 years earlier earned 9.1 percent less than nonbankrupters. This gap increased with the respondent's time since bankruptcy; bankrupters Note: *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 SE = standard error. Analyses are for the sample of respondents with annual earnings between $1 and $250,000 and weekly hours between 5 and 100. All predictor variables are measured at time t-1 and the outcome is measured at time t. Analyses are based on Model 3 in Table 3 , which includes all timevarying control variables. Coefficients for control variables are not shown. Tables 4 and 5 , which include all control variables and interactions between bankruptcy and education. I obtained predicted values and confidence intervals (not shown) using the coefficients and their covariance matrix with a multivariate normal distribution. In this figure, the respondents' bankruptcy status, age and education levels were allowed to vary, but all other variables were held at their means. "High education" refers to 18 years of education (two standard deviations above the mean education). "Low education" refers to 13 years of education (the mean education). who declared 7 to 10 years ago earned 12.7 percent less than their nonbankrupt counterparts. Hours of work followed a similar pattern. Table 7 shows that respondents who declared bankruptcy 4 to 6 years ago worked the fewest hours compared with nonbankrupters, approximately 141 fewer hours (4 fewer weeks) per year. However, respondents who declared bankruptcy more recently did not necessarily work fewer hours per year than nonbankrupters, and those who declared bankruptcy over 7 years ago worked 107 to 117 fewer hours (3 fewer weeks) per year.
These results indicate that bankruptcy's negative labor market effects continue for many years after a person declares bankruptcy and may even become stronger over time. The bigger gaps between respondents who went bankrupt longer ago and nonbankrupters in their earnings and hours worked point to a widening gap between individuals as cumulative disadvantage theory predicts. Importantly, bankruptcy does not appear to attenuate the cycle of cumulative disadvantage as some lawmakers intended.
Discussion
My analysis demonstrates that a person's stigmatized credit market statusoperationalized as bankruptcy -can limit his or her ability to obtain resources within the labor market. Net of unobserved individual characteristics, timevarying control variables and, most importantly, earlier labor market statuses, bankrupters spent less time working and suffered lower earnings, especially those with high levels of education.
In its current form, bankruptcy is a specific legal status that epitomizes insolvency and extreme debt delinquency. Because of its complicated filing process and later penalties, most individuals declare bankruptcy as a last resort. These individuals usually have high debt-to-income ratios, and many have a history of missed payments, but most also come from middle-class backgrounds. 12 Although most bankrupters are not impoverished, many experience adverse NLSY 1979 Cohort, 1979 -2008 . N = 4,291 cases and 55,110 observations. events that lead them to declare bankruptcy and spark a process of cumulative disadvantage (Sullivan et al. 1989 (Sullivan et al. , 2000 . Taken together, my findings suggest a process indicative of cumulative disadvantage, but not necessarily for those at the very bottom of earnings and education distribution. Instead, for more advantaged bankrupters -those with more education and earnings -the stigmatized status led to greater disadvantage relative to similar nonbankrupters, which could occur because they work in high-trust occupations where employers rely on credit reports. However, bankruptcy could also specifically scar these bankrupters because their advantaged status insulates them from other stigmatized statuses, such as poverty and low education, which normally would outweigh the negative effects of bankruptcy. 13 Although this analysis establishes connections between bankruptcy and negative labor market outcomes, it cannot determine the specific mechanism behind this relationship. Multiple mechanisms can lead to the accumulation of disadvantage across markets. However, my analytic strategies allowed me to rule out certain mechanisms related to unobserved individual-level characteristics and past adverse events. Because fixed effects models focus on within-individual variation, these models indicate that, even though prior to bankruptcy many bankrupters already earn less and work fewer hours than nonbankrupters, once they formally declare bankruptcy, bankrupters face further labor market disadvantage. Additionally, by controlling for the respondent's experience of adverse events within the past decade, I was able to show that bankruptcy affected labor market outcomes regardless of these events.
My research suggests that employers may statistically discriminate against bankrupters when this information is made available to them. In hiring or assigning people to jobs, employers often rely on characteristics that are not direct measures of ability to predict the performance of future workers. Employers "statistically discriminate" when they use an individual's race, ethnicity and marital status as proxy indicators for future productivity and work ethic (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Holzer 1996; Moss and Tilly 2001) . As a negative credential, bankruptcy becomes a legitimate, but not necessarily accurate, status distinction that employers rely on. Credit scoring may not be the mechanism behind bankruptcy's negative earnings and employment effects, but my findings show that it is a possibility. In this cohort sample, I demonstrate that bankruptcy's stigma extends across credit and labor markets, a finding that is strengthened by my analytic methods and the covariates that I include in my analyses. I use fixed effects models that control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics of individuals that may affect their probability of declaring bankruptcy and their labor market outcomes. I impose strict controls on my analyses by separating bankruptcy and labor market outcomes by one time period and estimating bankruptcy's effects net of the respondent's previous labor market situation. I also control for other time-varying characteristics, including education, marital status and adverse events.
The statistical procedures and data used impose certain limitations on this analysis. Fixed effects models are advantageous for longitudinal data analysis because they control for unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics (Gelman and Hill 2007; Allison 2009 ), but I cannot affirm causality with these models because they do not provide a counterfactual case to compare bankrupters with. Fixed effects models also ignore between-individual variation and weight each individual equally, which may slant results toward individuals with more cases in an unbalanced panel dataset (Gelman and Hill 2007) . In addition, although these models control for unmeasured predictors that are constant over time, they cannot control for unmeasured predictors that vary over time, which could influence the results (Allison 2009 ). To account for these limitations, I replicated my findings with other statistical methods that include generalized least squares models with robust standard errors that account for individual clustering, random effects models and hybrid mixed effects models. Although the significance levels and magnitude of the coefficients differed, these models yielded similar estimates for the outcome variables of interest.
The nature of the NLSY data also limits the generalizability of these findings. Because the NLSY follows a cohort of individuals, my findings might differ for individuals who were born before 1957 or after 1965. To further check these findings, I tested models that included sampling weights provided by the NLSY, which account for clustering by sampling unit, and I estimated the same models using the full NLSY sample, which oversamples poor individuals, blacks, and Hispanics. These models also produced similar estimates to those shown in this article.
Conclusion
Although Weber recognized the importance of property ownership for people's life chances, sociologists have largely overlooked the role of credit markets in generating inequality (Weber [1922 (Weber [ ]1946 (Weber [ , 1978 . Today the credit market continues to contribute to inequality in the United States. The current economic crisis, which is leading to rising rates of bankruptcy, took root in the credit market. More generally, credit markets increase wealth and the power it confers for purveyors of credit, but for some borrowers, credit leads to debt delinquency and bankruptcy. Bankruptcy, in particular, confers a stigmatized status that extends to how people fare in labor markets. In such situations, credit markets act to increase overall inequality, advantaging some at the expense of others.
The federal government plays a role in regulating credit markets and bankruptcy, but federal bankruptcy law does not exist solely to protect insolvent debtors. It aids debtors by promoting debt forgiveness, but it also helps creditors by ensuring an equitable division of the debtor's assets (Mann 2002; Warren and Westbrook 2009 ). In addition, bankruptcy supports economic growth and entrepreneurship, and, perhaps most importantly, it protects the rest of society from having to recoup the losses of others. As the subprime mortgage market collapse has shown, when debtors cannot pay large debts, crises extend beyond the individual, and the concentration of insolvent debtors can affect entire communities (Rugh and Massey 2010) . Although debt forgiveness is necessary for a well-functioning economy, bankruptcy still carries a stigma of individual failure that can affect later outcomes.
Bankruptcy does not offer a true fresh start because ambiguities in U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the FCRA allow employers to access credit reports, which does not fully protect bankrupters from the transmission of credit market disadvantage into the labor market. This raises an important question for policymakers: what are the permissible uses for credit reports? Currently, there is no evidence to indicate that credit scores reliably predict job performance, but employers often rely on these reports in hiring decisions. Thus, credit reports can send distracting signals to employers, affecting their productivity, as well as leading to discriminatory outcomes for workers. 13 To address these legal ambiguities and the potential for discrimination, further research is necessary to inform policymakers about when and how employers use bankruptcy, credit history and background checks to evaluate job applicants and employees. If the government wants to pursue a policy of debt forgiveness, policymakers need to consider the stigma associated with bankruptcy. As it stands, debt may be forgiven, but a person's credit history is not forgotten.
Notes
1. This theory originated with Merton's (1968 Merton's ( , 1988 analysis of recognition in the scientific community, in which highly cited researchers were more likely than less cited researchers to receive subsequent recognition. Sociologists have since used this concept to explain growing disparities between groups in various arenas, including education, health and employment (National Research Council 2004; DiPrete and Eirich 2006) . 2. Debtors can file for two types of nonbusiness bankruptcy: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharges all unsecured debts. Individuals are not obliged to use future earnings to pay back debt, but they must turn over all assets above a certain exemption level. Chapter 13 is intended for debtors with regular incomes.
These individuals do not turn over their assets, but they must propose a plan to repay a portion of their debt. 3. In Rea v. Federated Investors (2010) , the Court ruled that the Bankruptcy Code did not forbid private employers from discriminating against bankrupters in hiring. Unlike section 525(a) of the code, which applies to government employers, section 525(b), which is specific to private employers, does not include the phrase "deny employment to." 4. The original sample of 12,686 respondents was composed of a cross-sectional sample of 6,111 respondents, as well as a supplemental sample of 5,295 respondents that oversampled civilian Hispanic, black and economically disadvantaged nonblack/non-Hispanic youth and a military sample of 1,280 respondents (NLSY79 User's Guide). 5. Removing these extreme outliers helped to account for the survey's top-coding of earnings variables and potential errors in the data. 6. Because fixed effects estimates require within-individual variation, I dropped respondents who were interviewed only once after dropping cases with missing data. Therefore, I have an unbalanced panel dataset with 2 to 23 observations for each individual. 7. Interviewers asked respondents in 2004 and 2008 about when they declared bankruptcy. I re-coded this variable to each interview year using the year and month when the respondent declared bankruptcy. If a respondent declared bankruptcy in the interview year, but after the month of the interview, I recorded that bankruptcy in the next interview year. For example, if a respondent declared bankruptcy in December of 1986, but was interviewed in July of 1986, that bankruptcy is coded as 1987. 8. I estimated models including a dichotomous variable indicating whether there was a 1-year or 2-year time lag. Because year is strongly correlated with the 1-year or 2-year lag variable, this variable was statistically significant only when I did not include an age or time variable as well. 9. Including the respondent's spouse in the question did not affect my results. Differences in outcomes between individuals who were single and married in 2004 or 2008 did not indicate problems with this variable. In cases in which married couples jointly file, that filing would appear on both of their credit reports. 10. Due to the nature of this cohort sample, where respondents progress in age together over time, age also accounts for time in these models. 11. Please contact author for detailed list of state statutes and references. 12. Filing for bankruptcy is expensive, which makes it unavailable to many people.
BAPCPA also reduced bankruptcy's appeal to debtors by increasing the costs of filing and forcing some debtors to repay creditors from postbankruptcy earnings (White 2007a (White , 2007b . It also required a means test of monthly income to qualify for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and prohibited debtors from proposing their own Chapter 13 repayment plan. 13. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
